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This thesis presents a number of algorithms for forming coaliti ns among cooperative agents
in pragmatic domains where traditional cooperative game theory solution concepts do not
apply due to bounded rationality of agents. While previous work in coalition formation in
multi-agent systems research operated on relatively smallnumber of agents, e.g. less than
30 agents, this work explores coalition formation among 100agents, this is due to limited
computational resources not the performance of the our algorithms. We explore a best-
first search centralized algorithm for optimal coalition struc ures which is based on a novel
idea of deciding what is the best coalition to put into coalition structure being generated.
Empirical results show that the solution reaches optimality quickly and terminates quickly
in pragmatic domains. We further explore on optimal coalition structures with distributed
algorithms in linear and non-linear domains. For the lineardomains, we explore linear pro-
duction and integer programming. For the non-linear domains we explore logistic providers.
Based on existing algorithms, we explore a novel environmentof forming coalitions in sup-
ply networks involving buyers, sellers and logistics providers agents. In this setting, buyers
form coalitions to increase their negotiation power while sellers and logistics providers form
coalitions to aggregate their supply power and optimize their resources usage.
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